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At the present time, Ernst Mach’s contribution to contemporary epistemology is too often 
neglected in the philosophical studies. Although his name appears in several writings 
published by influential philosophers from the twentieth century, and during the last decades 
some scholars dealt with Mach’s legacy, he is still sometimes considered as a secondary 
thinker, that is, an author who contributed to the development of some interesting ideas, but 
whose merits are not so relevant that he should be thoroughly studied. On the contrary, 
Mach’s role in the contemporary cultural history is quite important, and it is possible to say 
of the people who nowadays pay little attention to him what Einstein, a hundred years ago, 
wrote of the opponents of Mach – that they “scarcely know how much of Mach’s way of 
thinking they have absorbed, so to say, with their mother’s milk.”1 
Aim of the present paper is to shed light on Ernst Mach’s role in the history of thought, from 
a somewhat “untraditional” point of view. The guiding lines of the research, indeed, do not 
come from special studies in epistemology or in the history of the philosophy of science, but 
rather from an investigation carried on by the German scholar Werner Stegmaier, who 
focused on the topic of “orientation” as characteristic feature of modern and contemporary 
Western philosophical culture. In his main work on that issue (Philosophie der Orientierung, 
2008) Stegmaier scarcely deals with the philosophy of science, and is rather more concerned 
with questions that – only apparently – are related to a different field of study. Nevertheless, 
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as will be shown, this is a fertile perspective for studying Mach, since it helps contextualize 
his investigation in the cultural debate of the final decades of the nineteenth century, thus 
showing some elements that otherwise would remain hidden. With no intention of pretending 
that Mach was someone that he himself always refused to be – i.e., a philosopher – this paper 
aims to stress the philosophical relevance of some outcomes of Mach’s investigations, and 
to show that they are consistent with particular issues that pertain to modern and 
contemporary philosophy.  
In what follows it will be argued that Mach belonged to the thematic path outlined by 
Stegmaier and, furthermore, that he gave an original contribution to that path by developing 
a pragmatic epistemology. In order to properly contextualise the paper, two premises will be 
needed. Section 1 will therefore be devoted to explain (a) what is the Philosophy of 
orientation; (b) which definition of “pragmatism” will be adopted in this paper; finally, (c) 
what pragmatism has to do with the problem of orientation in philosophy. 
 
1. Orientierung and Pragmatism 
Werner Stegmaier’s Philosophie der Orientierung (2008) offers a thorough study of the 
meaning and use of the notion of “orientation” in modern and contemporary philosophy. 
According to Stegmaier, that notion played an important role in Western philosophical 
culture, for it is related with some issues debated since the late-eighteenth century 
(particularly in Germany). Furthermore, Stegmaier stresses that the German word 
Orientierung is recent and that its use in philosophy dates more or less two and a half 
centuries. That term has of course first a topographical meaning (it actually means “to look 
at orient”, that is, “to find the east”), but it can be used in many senses, in order to describe 
attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, etc. In general, Orientierung means “the capacity of finding our 
way in a specific situation [Leistung, sich in einer Situation zurechtzufinden] and adopting 
solutions that allow us to have that situation in control.”2 This definition can be applied to 
several different fields, that is to say, orientation is not only a matter for theoretical 
investigation, but rather involves issues that also pertain to pragmatic (or practical) research, 
Ethics and Morality.3 
The origin of the philosophical meaning of the notion of Orientierung in the German-
speaking world can be traced back to Immanuel Kant. As Stegmaier argues, it is in Kant’s 
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writing What Does it Mean, to Orient Oneself in Thinking? (1786) that one finds a 
philosophically relevant use of the verbal form “to orient oneself”.4 With that text, Kant 
contributed to a debate on Belief and Reason (Glauben and Vernunft) by adopting the idea 
of orientation as a pivotal concept connecting those notions. In Kant, sich orientieren can be 
seen as a type of make-believe which is presupposed in any activity of Reason and, therefore, 
is involved in the actual critique of the Reason itself.5 Leaving aside the details of Kant’s 
1786 text, for that would lead us far beyond the aims of the present paper, it is worth 
remembering the general problem that Kant was facing. That is, the problem of human 
knowledge and the value of make-believe, a problem that strongly influenced modern and 
contemporary philosophy, for it led to the heated topic of relativism (not to mention nihilism), 
which has been widely debated during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The importance of the notion of orientation in and for philosophy can be found in the idea 
that “to find our way” in the world is a fundamental necessity of the human being. 
Orientierung, therefore, lies at the basis of any questioning, of any posing problem itself, and 
it is so deeply rooted in our approach to reality that, on 1872, the German thinker Julius 
Baumann (that will be also mentioned in sec. 2 of the present paper) adopted the newly coined 
word Weltorientierung as a synonymous of “philosophy”.6 To put it briefly, the idea is that, 
at any level of his activity (theoretical, practical, etc.) the human being has to do with a 
potential disorientation, for contemporary philosophers questioned the actual existence of the 
reference points of our world description and interpretation. From that viewpoint, one can 
interpret the several forms of relationship of the human being with the external world as 
attempts to provide means for the orientation. These forms include religion, art, and ethics – 
but also science, which should not be seen as separated from the general philosophical 
thought (as nowadays sometimes happens).  
In his reconstruction of the presence of the theme of orientation in philosophy, Stegmaier 
indeed devotes some sections to the role that signs (Zeichen) play in our relationship with the 
world, and focuses especially on logic and scientific thought. For him, concepts, names, and 
logical notions, all have a fundamental symbolic value, and can therefore be seen as means 
for an orientation in the specific fields to which they pertain, but also as tools for finding our 
way in the world in a broader sense.7 That view of course implies a new consideration of 
science, whose aim has not to be seen as to provide an actual knowledge of reality, but only 
to manage it and predict its development as well as possible. The very notion of truth, thus, 
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acquires a quite different meaning from the one that was taught by the old schools of 
philosophy. According to Stegmaier, truth becomes a kind of regulative idea, an ideal 
objective of research: as he argues, “truth is the escape point [Fluchtpunkt] of scientific 
orientation, the point towards which she is oriented.”8 
The meaning of what above stated will be clearer when Ernst Mach’s position will be taken 
into account (sect. 2 and 3). As for now, let us consider the second premise of this paper, that 
is, pragmatism. In what follows, pragmatism will be considered from a broad point of view, 
as an inclusive philosophical research program. In particular, pragmatism can be seen as a 
peculiar reaction to the problem of the meaning of ideas and truth, that is, as a strategy for 
dealing with a disorientation which is epistemological as much as practical. As argued by 
William James in the chapter of The Meaning of Truth titled Humanism and Truth, 
pragmatism arises from the development of modern epistemology and faces the relativism 
implied in “the break-down which the last fifty years have brought about in the older notions 
of scientific truth.”9 According to James, the “multiplication of theories” in the second half 
of the nineteenth century led to a sceptic view of the value of scientific laws and concepts; 
as a result, these laws and concepts should be treated only as “conceptual shorthand, true so 
far as they are useful but not farther.”10 In order to avoid that scepticism and any kind of 
epistemological nihilism, it is necessary to find a way to manage relativism and, if possible, 
also to make it productive. That was the aim of several epistemologies that have been 
developed during the late-nineteenth and the early-twentieth century, research programs that 
shared a positive attitude towards the relativism above mentioned and that worked out 
comparable methods for determining the value of ideas with no truth-value. As Christophe 
Bouriau recently argued, these methods are pragmatic at their very core, insofar as they are 
grounded on the belief “that from the positive practical implications of certain ideas, the 
value of these ideas may be determined, such implications being conceived in terms of 
operational convenience and of fruitfulness.”11 
As final preliminary remark, it is worth noting that pragmatism, thus conceived, is deeply 
concerned with several fundamental features of the “philosophy of orientation”. From a 
general point of view, indeed, pragmatism contributed to contemporary philosophy by 
focusing on the problem of providing means for finding our way in the world, thus facing the 
same disorientation Stegmaier talks about in his volume. Moreover, pragmatism considers as 
a primary criterion for evaluating ideas and theories precisely their operational fruitfulness 
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as means for describing and managing the world – that is to say, for orientation. Finally, the 
most important pragmatist thinkers (e.g. Peirce and James) have been concerned with the 
specific topics of signs and – in particular – truth, and the outcomes of their reflections are 
consistent with Stegmaier’s argument.  
 
2. The task of philosophical and scientific thought 
Given these premises, it is now possible to address the question: What does Mach have to do 
with the “philosophy of orientation”? As will be argued, more than one can imagine. 
In talking about scientific knowledge, Ernst Mach is especially as much as explicitly 
concerned with the problem of orientation. In the final section of the first chapter of the 
Analysis of Sensations, for example, he states that “the biological task of science is to provide 
the fully developed human individual with as perfect means of orientating himself as possible 
[eine möglichst vollstandige Orientirung].”12 Some years later, in a paper on Sensory 
Elements and Scientific Concepts (1910), Mach sums up his view on the elements and their 
“dependence upon a complex of elements which includes one’s own body,” and then argues: 
“Only in so far as we establish the dependence of the elements on one another and explore 
those connections, whose stability is determined by the elements, can we orient ourselves in 
the world [in der Welt orientieren].”13 These excerpts already show that Mach adopted the 
terminology that pertains to the thematic field investigated by Stegmaier, that is to say, Mach 
uses the term Orientierung with a meaning that is not topographical, and he does so with 
regard to an intellectual activity of the highest level. Moreover, Mach proves to be concerned 
with the same fundamental problem that characterizes modern and contemporary Western 
culture and that gives philosophical value to the theme of orientation: namely, the lack of 
absolute and unchanging reference points (that is, truths) of human knowledge. 
If one wants to explore the possibility of relating Mach with the Philosophie der 
Orientierung, the most interesting textual evidence can be found in the first chapter of 
Knowledge and Error (1905). That chapter is devoted to Philosophical and Scientific 
Thought, and in its opening sections Mach presents some observations on human knowledge 
from an evolutionary point of view. In the fourth paragraph, Mach deals with scientific 
thought (wissenschaftliche Denken), which, in his view, “presents itself in two seemingly 
different forms: as philosophy and as specialist research.” Then, Mach argues: 




The philosopher seeks to orient himself as completely and comprehensively as possible [sucht eine möglichst 
vollständige, weltumfassende Orientierung] in relation to the totality of facts, which necessarily involves him 
in building on material borrowed from the special sciences. The special scientist is at first concerned only with 
finding his way [um Orientierung und Übersicht … zu tun] about a smaller area of facts. Since, however, facts 
are always somewhat arbitrarily and forcibly defined with a view to the momentary intellectual aim, these 
boundary lines are constantly shifting as scientific thought advances: in the end the scientist too comes to see 
that the results of all other special enquiries must be taken into account, for the sake of orientation 
[Orientierung] in his own field. Clearly in this way special enquirers also collectively aim at a total picture 
[eine Weltorientierung] through amalgamation of all special fields. Since this is at best imperfectly attainable, 
this effort leads to more or less covert borrowings from philosophical thought. The ultimate end of all research 
is thus the same.14 
 
In this excerpt Mach talks again of “orientation” as task of both philosophers and special 
scientists, and uses the German word Orientierung as he did in other writings. Nevertheless, 
the passage contains something more, namely a hidden reference that is fundamental for the 
aim of the present paper. At the end of the quoted excerpt, Mach talks of the “total picture” 
that the special enquirers collectively aim at gaining. In the original German version of 
Knowledge and Error, Mach uses the word Weltorientierung (italics by Mach), a term that 
appears only here in his whole writing. This isolated case cannot be by chance, and in fact it 
is revealing. As mentioned in the previous section of this paper, the word Weltorientierung 
first appeared in the German speaking world in Julius Baumann’s book Philosophie als 
Orientirung über die Welt. Baumann is an author scarcely known in modern times, but that 
at the end of the nineteenth century played his part in the philosophical debate.15 If one looks 
at the pages of Baumann’s book where that word appears, it is easy to see that the questions 
there explored are exactly the same as those Mach deals with in the above quoted passage 
from Knowledge and Error. 
Baumann, indeed, talks of Weltorientierung in the preface of his 1872 book. In that text, 
Baumann defends the idea that philosophy actually means “general orientation in the world 
through thought.”16 Moreover, Baumann argues that philosophy gains an important aid from 
scientific thought (wissenschaftliche Nachdenken), and he then deals with the relationship 
between scientific philosophy and the special sciences.17 For Baumann, the only difference 
between philosophical and scientific thought concerns the limits of their application. While 
philosophy aims to reach a general and universal knowledge, each special science deals with 
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a limited portion of the world, and can therefore only gain an orientation that will be restricted 
to these portions (“wir haben in ihnen blos Orientierungen über einzelne Theile der Welt”).18 
Of course, if we collect the outcomes of all the special sciences, the result will be a general 
overview of the world. In other words: “Each science, if separated from the others, provides 
us with a limited orientation in the world [ein Stück Weltorientierung], while all the sciences 
taken together can provide us with a complete orientation [die Ganze Weltorientierung].”19 
What the orientation provided by the special sciences lacks is the general and universal 
perspective that pertains only to philosophy, which, in Baumann’s view, remains at the very 
edge of the pyramid of human knowledge. 
As above suggested, there is a striking similarity between Baumann’s and Mach’s texts. Both 
the authors deal with the relationship between philosophy and special sciences, that they both 
consider as an expression of scientific thought in general. Moreover, the task that both 
Baumann and Mach attribute to these disciplines is also the same – namely, to provide man 
with a general orientation in the world (Weltorientierung). Thus, although there is no actual 
proof that Mach read Baumann’s 1872 book (unfortunately, the text does not appear among 
Mach’s documents stored at the Deutsches Museum in Munich), there are good reasons in 
support of the idea that Philosophie als Orientirung über die Welt is the hidden reference of 
the quoted passage from Knowledge and Error. Moreover, it can be argued that Mach’s 
concerning with orientation in and through science should not be seen as a minor topic of his 
epistemological investigation. 
 
3. Pragmatic epistemology 
What has been considered above supports the idea that Mach belongs to that section of the 
history of Western culture and philosophy outlined by Stegmaier’s Philosophie der 
Orientierung.20 This idea is corroborated by the fact that Mach gave an original contribution 
to that history, that contribution consisting in the value and function Mach attributed to 
scientific concepts – which are the actual means of orientation. An investigation on Mach’s 
view of scientific concepts will therefore answer the question: What does it mean, for Mach, 
to orient oneself in (and through) science?  
To address that question allows us to define what can be called “Mach’s pragmatism”. An 
investigation of the nature and role of scientific concepts and theories, and, consequently, of 
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the meaning of scientific “truths”, actually pertains to the research program that arose during 
the second half of the nineteenth century and to which William James gave a collective name. 
As known, James has been particularly influenced by Mach in developing his own form of 
pragmatism. The overlapping of Mach’s views on psychology and epistemology with those 
defended by James has been stressed by authors who personally knew Mach (e.g. Hans 
Kleinpeter and Philipp Frank),21 and during the last decades studies have been devoted to 
that topic, in order to show the “state of elective – but also selective – affinity” that 
characterized the relationship between Mach and James.22 James’s considerable number of 
annotations in his private copies of works such as Analysis of Sensations and Knowledge and 
Error demonstrates his interest in Mach’s investigations, and reveal the former’s attempt to 
indicate similarities between Mach’s views and his own position or current interest.23 As 
Gerald Holton concludes, “James’s copies of Mach’s book graphically demonstrate the 
intense impression they made on him during the period in which he was engaged in writing 
his own major works.”24 That impression is particularly evident in James’s Pragmatism, 
where the debt to Mach is explicitly mentioned.25 In general, it is possible to say that jamesian 
pragmatism is deeply grounded on machian basis, and that is why Mach himself, in a famous 
letter he sent to James on June 28, 1907, admitted: “Although I am by my entire training a 
scientist and not at all a philosopher, nevertheless I stand very close to pragmatism in my 
ways of thinking, without ever having used that name.”26 
Ralph Perry stated that “from Mach, James had learned something of what he knew about 
the history of science, and he had readily accepted his view of the biological [evolutionary] 
and economic function of scientific concepts.”27 Both these elements are fundamental 
features of Mach’s pragmatic epistemology that can be found at the origin of his idea that 
science provides “the fully developed human individual with as perfect means of orientating 
himself as possible”.28 In Knowledge and Error, Mach argues that concepts are mental 
constructs produced by a process of abstraction, thought symbols that “enable man to classify 
the real.”29 According to him, “concepts [are] so valuable and useful for science, [for] they 
can represent and symbolize in thoughts large areas of fact. The purpose of concepts is to 
allow us to find our way in the bewildering tangle of fact [in der verwirrenden Verwicklung 
der Tatsachen sich zurecht zu finden].”30 It is easy to see that Mach is in total agreement with 
the perspective of a Philosophie der Orientierung. “The capacity of finding our way [zurecht 
finden] in a specific situation” is actually the definition of Orientierung (see above, sec. 1), 
Pietro Gori – Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 2019                                                                                                   9 
 
 
and in dealing with concepts Mach focuses on the same symbolic value that Stegmaier 
stresses, when he talks about the role and function of signs in the scientific discourse. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Mach’s view of the scientific concepts presents some 
original features that can be stressed by making reference to other writings where he deals 
with that same topic. 
It is well-known that Mach defended an evolutionary conception of knowledge, according to 
which science is the final product of an intellectual development. Within that framework, 
concepts are but “mental symbols for groups of sensations – symbols that do not exist outside 
our thought”.31 Therefore, in Mach’s view, scientific concepts do not correspond to external 
reality, that is to say, they do not describe reality as it is in itself. The anti-realistic picture 
that can be drawn from Mach’s statements on the economical nature of physical inquiry – 
that is, the idea that the name we give to a group of properties is nothing “more than a 
compendious economical symbol” – is mitigated by his famous view of the adaptation of 
thoughts to facts and of thoughts to one another.32 If literally applied to epistemology, the 
Darwinian model suggests that thoughts are shaped accordingly to external reality, whose 
general features could therefore be inferred from the attributes of thoughts themselves. This 
hypothetical realism is a kind of “third way” between realism and anti-realism, and helps 
dealing with an issue that, in Mach, is not always so clear.33 However, this latter dichotomy 
can be addressed in a different way, which is precisely what I think Mach did. 
Concepts, according to Mach, are a creation of human thought whose relationship with facts 
cannot be neglected. Therefore, concepts are not a product of pure imagination, but at the 
same time they do not just reflect the external world. The original contribution of Mach to 
that topic consists in leaving aside the content of scientific concepts (the portion of reality 
they should describe), and to look, instead, at the practical role they play, at the activity they 
represent. As Mach states in The Principles of the Theory of Heat, “the strict definition of a 
concept and, in case it is familiar, even the name of the concept is a stimulus to a precisely 
determined though often complicated, testing, comparing or constructing activity whose 
result, in most cases perceptible by the senses, is a term in the extension of the concept.”34 
For what concerns physics, in particular, concepts can be seen as “instructions for building”, 
while “facts are the results of building”.35 Moreover, in Mach’s view “the concept is not a 
finished idea, but body of directions for testing some actually existing idea with respect to 
certain properties, or of constructing some idea from given properties. The definition of the 
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concept, or the name of the concept, releases a definite activity, a definite reaction, which 
has a definite result.”36 
This is a pure pragmatic epistemology. The value of a concept is not judged on the basis of 
what that concept represents or describes, but rather by looking at what it produces, that is, 
at the effects of the reaction the concept releases. This idea can be found in Mach’s very 
definition of “knowledge” and “error”. As James sums up in some marginalia at the end of 
Chapter 7 of his personal copy of the 1905 edition of Erkenntnis und Irrtum, “error in Mach's 
eyes has the exclusively practical meaning of a concept that leads to disappointment in 
expectation. Täuschung [deception] leads to Enttäuschung [disappointment], Wahrheit 
[truth] to Bestätigung [confirmation].”37 The only difference, therefore, lies in the result of 
each evaluation, which proves (or denies) the actual operational convenience and fruitfulness 
of a conception in guiding our expectations. As Mach argues in his late paper on Sensory 
elements and Scientific Concepts, “whether our expectation is satisfied (…) or is 
disappointed, in both cases the value of the concept will be determined by testing.”38 
Mach’s view is consistent with the thematic lines presented in the first section of this paper. 
As many other thinkers from the second half of the nineteenth century, Mach is concerned 
with a conception of human knowledge that is quite different from the traditional one, and 
that, by rejecting the idea that our thoughts correspond to external reality, leads to a mere 
relativistic view of “truth”. Given that concepts and theories cannot be judged by looking at 
their actual content, and that man needs some principles of evaluation in order to keep on 
pursuing scientific research, Mach explores the same possibility other pragmatist thinkers of 
his time took into account and focuses on the practical consequences of ideas. As above 
stated, the main aim of all this is to provide man with principles of orientation in the world.  
For what concerns the actual orientation that, in Mach’s view, scientific concepts provide us, 
some hints can be found in the final chapter of Knowledge and Error devoted to Sense and 
Value of the Laws of Nature. In that text, Mach contrasts the usual opinion “that the laws of 
nature are rules, which processes in nature must obey,” with the idea that these laws are only 
the result of an abstraction from natural processes, that is to say, “our intuition and our 
concepts alone prescribe laws to nature.”39 That view clearly limits the normative value of 
the laws of nature. According to Mach, their value rests on their role of “restrictions that 
under the guidance of our experience we prescribe to our expectations,” a role that stresses 
the biological importance of these laws, which is coherent with the general evolutionary 
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conception of science defended by Mach.40 What is worth noting, for the aim of the present 
paper, is that Mach’s dealing with that topic is related with the theme of orientation. Indeed, 
Mach argues that the “laws of nature are a product of our psychological need to find our way 
about [zurecht finden] in nature, so that we do not stand estranged and baffled in front of 
natural processes.”41 Furthermore, he stresses that they must be considered only as the most 
recent “attempt at orientation [Orientierungsversuch]” produced by our “current state of 
culture”.42 According to Mach, the main urge of scientific research at the beginning of the 
twentieth century is “to minimize mental effort, to attain economy, continuity, constancy, 
and as general a scope as possible for profitably applying the rules set up.”43 The value of 
scientific laws and theories thus lies in their practical efficacy, in their operational fruitfulness 
as economical tools for dealing with the hitherto accumulated individual findings. “Natural 
science,” continues Mach, “may be viewed as a kind of collection of instruments 
[Instrumentsammlung] for the intellectual completion of any partially given facts or for the 
restriction, as far as may be, of expectations in future cases.”44 As above considered with 
reference to the distinction between “knowledge” and “error,” what is fundamental in Mach’s 
epistemology is the role of expectations. The laws of nature are, in his view, “merely 
subjective prescriptions for an observer’s expectations to which reality need not conform,”45 
and their value can only be judged pragmatically, by looking whether those expectations are 
finally met or disappointed. Therefore, the role of scientific laws as instruments for finding 
our way about in the natural world is far from being normative. “A proposition in natural 
science always has a merely hypothetical sense,”46 and, as Mach concludes, “science has 
developed into the factor that is biologically and culturally the most beneficial” for she 
replaces “tentative and unconscious adaptation by a faster variety that is fully conscious and 
methodical.”47 However, that does not mean that the laws that science abstracts from the 
natural processes can be seen as norms from which those processes cannot deviate. On the 
contrary, in Mach’s view, the role science plays in human orientation lies in her capability of 
providing men with working hypotheses, with concepts that are merely mental constructs and 
human devices for testing some existing idea and fruitfully guiding our expectations. That is, 
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